Twitter
youtube
Discord
Contact us
Forums
New posts
Trending
Rules
Explore
Bioenergetic Wiki
Bioenergetic Life Search
Bioprovement Peat Search
Ray Peat Interviews by Danny Roddy
Master List: Ray Peat, PhD Interviews & Quotes by FPS
Traveling Resources
Google Flights
Wiki Voyage
DeepL Translator
Niche
Numbeo
Merch
Log in
Register
What's new
Search
Search
Search engine:
Threadloom Search
XenForo Search
Search titles only
By:
New posts
Trending
Menu
Log in
Register
Navigation
Install the app
Install
More options
Light/Dark Mode
Contact us
Close Menu
Information
World News
Tell HN: Stytch Login SaaS Unicorn has common auth vulnerabilities
JavaScript is disabled. For a better experience, please enable JavaScript in your browser before proceeding.
You are using an out of date browser. It may not display this or other websites correctly.
You should upgrade or use an
alternative browser
.
Reply to thread
Message
<blockquote data-quote="Hacker News" data-source="post: 71509" data-attributes="member: 365"><p>_TL;DR_: Stytch, a Login SaaS Unicorn, has no CRSF-protection in their authentication API and other questionable security practices, coupled with a nonexistent security policy.</p><p>First of all: Why am I posting this on Hacker News instead of disclosing directly?</p><p>From experience, a lack of security policies and of communication on existing vulnerabilities implies retaliatory practices when submitting vulnerabilities responsibly. Since MITRE CVE does not accept vulnerabilities for SaaS services, I figured that Hacker News would be the way to get Stytch aware of their issues without getting me in the crosshairs.</p><p>The setting:</p><p>A few weeks ago (in June 2022 to be exact) I was looking at different authentication services and Stytch was one of the services that got my attention. Stytch.com was founded in 2020 with over $125M [1] raised at a $1bn+ valuation [2].</p><p>Checking out what the fuzz was about I decided to look into their security practices. The lack of a bug bounty program (e.g. HackerOne), ethical disclosure policy, and security policy already left a bad feeling. But I was keeping an open mind and wanted to see what their API has to offer.</p><p>The scoop:</p><p>The most critical issue I came across was a complete lack of Cross-Site Request Forgery defenses. All of the provided authentication APIs (e.g. [4]) except for Social Sign-In are vulnerable to the most basic of login attack vectors: Login CSRF [3]. This can be used to steal credit card information, for example. CSRF is completely missing in all of the Stytchs API concepts, a major oversight in the API design.</p><p>Further I found that the OTP tokens sent via their "passwordless" email authentication were valid for up to 7 days and did not invalidate on use. Attackers may find old magic link tokens in the browser, chat, or email histories and use them to get a valid session. While this issue has been fixed since June 2022, the vulnerability was not disclosed to customers.</p><p>Recently, Stytch has introduced a concept from OAuth2 called PKCE - a spec that is difficult to master for everyday developers - into their non-standardized Magic Link API which does not use a three-legged delegation authorization mechanism. This is not a direct vulnerability per se, but at least a questionable choice in terms of security.</p><p>A full report can be found here for anyone interested: <a href="https://www.klgrth.io/paste/kmxof" target="_blank">https://www.klgrth.io/paste/kmxof</a></p><p>[1] <a href="https://www.crunchbase.com/organization/stytch-auth" target="_blank">https://www.crunchbase.com/organization/stytch-auth</a> [2] <a href="https://stytch.com/blog/announcing-series-b/" target="_blank">https://stytch.com/blog/announcing-series-b/</a> [3] <a href="https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Cross-Site_Request_Forgery_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html#login-csrf" target="_blank">https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Cross-Site_Request_Forgery_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html#login-csrf</a> [4] <a href="https://stytch.com/docs/passcodes#sms_auth" target="_blank">https://stytch.com/docs/passcodes#sms_auth</a></p><p></p><hr /><p></p><p>Comments URL: <a href="https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=33162854" target="_blank">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=33162854</a></p><p></p><p>Points: 25</p><p></p><p># Comments: 3</p><p></p><p><a href="https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=33162854" target="_blank">Continue reading...</a></p></blockquote><p></p>
[QUOTE="Hacker News, post: 71509, member: 365"] _TL;DR_: Stytch, a Login SaaS Unicorn, has no CRSF-protection in their authentication API and other questionable security practices, coupled with a nonexistent security policy. First of all: Why am I posting this on Hacker News instead of disclosing directly? From experience, a lack of security policies and of communication on existing vulnerabilities implies retaliatory practices when submitting vulnerabilities responsibly. Since MITRE CVE does not accept vulnerabilities for SaaS services, I figured that Hacker News would be the way to get Stytch aware of their issues without getting me in the crosshairs. The setting: A few weeks ago (in June 2022 to be exact) I was looking at different authentication services and Stytch was one of the services that got my attention. Stytch.com was founded in 2020 with over $125M [1] raised at a $1bn+ valuation [2]. Checking out what the fuzz was about I decided to look into their security practices. The lack of a bug bounty program (e.g. HackerOne), ethical disclosure policy, and security policy already left a bad feeling. But I was keeping an open mind and wanted to see what their API has to offer. The scoop: The most critical issue I came across was a complete lack of Cross-Site Request Forgery defenses. All of the provided authentication APIs (e.g. [4]) except for Social Sign-In are vulnerable to the most basic of login attack vectors: Login CSRF [3]. This can be used to steal credit card information, for example. CSRF is completely missing in all of the Stytchs API concepts, a major oversight in the API design. Further I found that the OTP tokens sent via their "passwordless" email authentication were valid for up to 7 days and did not invalidate on use. Attackers may find old magic link tokens in the browser, chat, or email histories and use them to get a valid session. While this issue has been fixed since June 2022, the vulnerability was not disclosed to customers. Recently, Stytch has introduced a concept from OAuth2 called PKCE - a spec that is difficult to master for everyday developers - into their non-standardized Magic Link API which does not use a three-legged delegation authorization mechanism. This is not a direct vulnerability per se, but at least a questionable choice in terms of security. A full report can be found here for anyone interested: [URL]https://www.klgrth.io/paste/kmxof[/URL] [1] [URL]https://www.crunchbase.com/organization/stytch-auth[/URL] [2] [URL]https://stytch.com/blog/announcing-series-b/[/URL] [3] [URL]https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Cross-Site_Request_Forgery_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html#login-csrf[/URL] [4] [URL]https://stytch.com/docs/passcodes#sms_auth[/URL] [HR][/HR] Comments URL: [URL]https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=33162854[/URL] Points: 25 # Comments: 3 [url="https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=33162854"]Continue reading...[/url] [/QUOTE]
Loading…
Insert quotes…
Verification
Post reply
Information
World News
Tell HN: Stytch Login SaaS Unicorn has common auth vulnerabilities
This site uses cookies to help personalise content, tailor your experience and to keep you logged in if you register.
By continuing to use this site, you are consenting to our use of cookies.
Accept
Learn more…
Top